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Fiscal sustainability of the Visegrad Group countries in the aftermath 
of global economic crisis 
The article investigates the sustainability of fiscal policies of the Visegrad Group 
countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) in the years 1996-
2015 using statistical and econometric analysis methods. Special attention is 
given to the identification of subperiods of low sustainability within the 
framework of the Markov switching cointegration model. The results of the 
research show that the global economic crisis had little effect on the fiscal stance 
of the analysed countries, because their expansionary, countercyclical fiscal 
policies were promptly replaced by more restrictive policies. However, further 
improvements in fiscal discipline are needed to ensure sufficient space for fiscal 
reaction in the future. 
Keywords: fiscal policy, fiscal sustainability, Visegrad Group, economic crisis, 
Markov switching cointegration. 
JEL classification codes: E 62, H 63. 
1. Introduction 
Fiscal policy is one of the most popular tools for stimulating economic growth. It is also 
frequently used to adjust market mechanisms in a way that allows the government to 
accomplish its economic and social goals. The present-day economic practice is 
predominantly based on the theories of the Keynesian school, including the welfare 
state concept that recommends stabilizing market processes and securing the quality of 
citizens’ lives, at least at the basic level, through the coordination and financing of the 
health, pension and social assistance systems. High costs of these solutions lead, 
however, to deficit financing and accumulation of debt. Excessive fiscal intervention 
erodes the foundations of further economic growth by weakening private sector’s 
activity and reducing the possibilities of raising capital that the sector needs to finance 
its ventures. A high level of debt in the economy may also have an adverse impact on 
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the solvency of the State, leading to a deep crisis and recession, or even to its 
bankruptcy. These concerns should be given special attention during an economic crisis 
when most stimulation programs intended to minimize the negative consequences of 
economic downturn are built around an expansionary fiscal policy.  
The concept of fiscal sustainability seeks to define the optimal level of public 
debt at which fiscal policy can accomplish its goals with a minimum negative impact on 
the economy. The aim of this article is to assess risks involved in the increasing use of 
deficit financing and public debt accumulation in the Visegrad Group countries from the 
perspective of fiscal sustainability. 
The article consists of six parts. In part two, the definition and theoretical basis 
of fiscal sustainability are presented. Part three discusses sustainability indicators and 
tests that are afterwards used in the empirical research. In part four, fiscal sustainability 
of the Visegrad Group countries is tested empirically using selected statistical methods 
and econometric tests. The empirical analysis of the Visegrad Group countries – the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – spanned the years 1996 through 2015. 
Part five provides an insight into the policy implications of the research results. The last 
part concludes.  
2. Fiscal sustainability – theoretical aspects  
The concept of fiscal sustainability presents it briefly as efforts undertaken to keep the 
size of public debt within reasonable limits. The term "reasonable" means here that 
public debt and budget deficit need to have a minimum negative effect on the economy, 
while efficiently stabilizing its performance over the business cycle. Definitions of 
fiscal stability in this vein have been proposed, inter alia, by Buiter (2004, p. 4), Uctum 
and Wickens (2000, p. 197), and Marchewka-Bartkowiak (2008, p. 55). An operational 
4 
 
definition of fiscal sustainability has been put forward by Blanchard, Choraqui, 
Hagemann, and Sartor (1990, p. 11) and Blanchard (1990, p. 13). It states that if fiscal 
policy could be reduced to a process generating public debt, the sustainable fiscal policy 
would be one bringing the public debt/GDP ratio back to its initial level. In other words, 
in the long run the real government debt should not grow faster than the interest rate and 
the debt/GDP ratio should be kept smaller than the difference between the rate of 
economic growth and the interest rate. This definition highlights the fact that while 
fiscal sustainability does not reject the use of expansive fiscal policy, it calls for actions 
stabilising or reducing the debt/GDP ratio to balance the fiscal situation after a period of 
increased spending. The primary objective of fiscal sustainability is therefore to prevent 
an explosive growth of debt, which is one of the main factors responsible for the 
destabilisation of an economy.  
A discussion of the theoretical aspects of fiscal sustainability should begin with 
the presentation of the concept of dynamic government budget constraint, i.e. an 
equation describing how differences between total government expenditures and 
revenues expand public debt: 
ܾ௦ = ݃௦ + ℎ௦ − ݐ௦ + ൫1 + (ݎ − ߠ)൯ܾ௦ିଵ = ݀௦ + ൫1 + (ݎ − ߠ)൯ܾ௦ିଵ, (1) 
where: ܾ௦, ݃௦, ℎ௦, ݐ௦ – the ratios between the real value of debt / government spending / 
transfers / taxes and the level of GDP in period s, 
ݎ – the real ex-post interest rate (the nominal interest rate minus the rate of 
inflation), 
ߠ – the real GDP growth rate, 
݀௦ – the ratio of the real value of the primary budget balance to GDP in period s, 
where  ݀௦ = ݃௦ + ℎ௦ − ݐ௦. 
5 
 
Following the works by Fischer (1989) and Blanchard et al. (1990), this 
equation can be rewritten into the intertemporal budget constraint:  
ܾ௡ = ܾ଴݁
(௥ିఏ)௡ + ∫ ݀௦
௡
଴
݁(௥ିఏ)(௡ି௦)݀ݏ. (2) 
according to which the ratio between the current value of debt and GDP is equal to the 
sum of the ratio’s initial value and primary deficits (in relation to GDP) accumulated 
over the analysed period, increased by the amount of interests that grows at the same 
rate as the difference between the real interest rate and the real GDP growth rate 
(Blanchard et al., 1990, p. 11). The budget constraint equation alone does not contain 
restrictions that could prevent public debt from growing too much (Romer, 2006, p. 
561). To handle threats arising from irresponsible fiscal policy, the concept of fiscal 
sustainability has been formulated, according to which the State’s fiscal policy is 
sustainable when it can maintain the initial level of debt / GDP ratio in the long term 
(Blanchard et al., 1990, p. 11).  
To make sure that the budget constraint equation accounts for the sustainability 
of fiscal policy, the so-called transversality condition must be added. It prevents the 
government from rolling debt over indefinitely, and from building public finances on 
the financial pyramid scheme (the so-called Ponzi scheme). According to the 
transversality condition, when n tends to infinity the discounted value of debt must tend 
to zero. This is tantamount to assuming that the value of debt/GDP ratio tends to its 
initial value of ܾ଴ (Blanchard et al., 1990, p. 12; Uctum & Wickens, 2000, p. 201):  
lim௡→ஶ ܾ଴݁ି
(௥ିఏ)௡ = 0. (3) 
Substituting this condition into equation (2), we get the government budget 
constraint that makes fiscal policy sustainable over an infinite time horizon:  
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−ܾ଴ = ∫ ݀௦
ஶ
଴
݁ି(௥ିఏ)௦݀ݏ. (4) 
Equation 4 implies that fiscal policy can be deemed sustainable, if "the present 
discounted value of the ratio of primary deficits to GDP is equal to the negative of 
current level of debt to GDP" (Blanchard et al., 1990, p. 12). When both sides of the 
equation are multiplied by -1 the interpretation is slightly different – fiscal policy is 
sustainable if the present value of all projected surpluses in the primary balance is equal 
to the value of public debt in the initial period (Blanchard, 1990, p. 13). This means that 
a country with fiscal policy based on deficit financing must also think about ways of 
acquiring surpluses so that its debt could be repaid. When the current policy falls short 
of the stability criterion, a discretionary change restoring stability can be made. These 
conditions can be satisfied even if the process of debt generation is structurally unstable 
(Uctum & Wickens, 2000, p. 202).  
From the analysis of equations (3) and (4) we conclude that the transversality 
condition does not imply that the government must follow a policy scenario zeroing the 
value of the debt/GDP ratio, in which case public debt would be completely eliminated 
as a source for financing budget deficits. It is only required that the rate of growth of the 
debt/GDP ratio be lower than the discounting factor ݎ − ߠ (Uctum & Wickens, 2000, p. 
200).  
For a finite time horizon, a slightly different definition of fiscal sustainability 
and sustainability conditions can be adopted. In this case, fiscal policy can be regarded 
as sustainable if it allows the debt/GDP ratio to be maintained at some target level. Then 
the intertemporal budgetary constraint is the following:  
ܾ଴ − ܾ௡∗ ݁ି
(௥ିఏ)௡ = − ∫ ݀௦
௡
଴
݁ି(௥ିఏ)௦݀ݏ, (5) 
where: ܾ௡∗  – the target level of debt to be achieved at the end of the analysed period. 
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According to this equation, the expected change in the debt/GDP ratio should be equal 
to the discounted value of the ratio between fiscal surpluses generated during that period 
and GDP. The fulfilment of this equation points to sustainability of fiscal policy in the 
analysed period; otherwise, either the target level of the debt/GDP ratio or the fiscal 
policy itself need to be changed (Uctum & Wickens, 2000, p. 205). 
3. Methods of fiscal sustainability assessment 
3.1.Sustainability indicators  
With the development of the concept of fiscal sustainability, a need arose to create tools 
with which the fiscal position of a country could be analysed taking account of the 
likely hazards, as well as allowing the most appropriate development policies to be 
designed. To meet the need, synthetic and easy-to-interpret indicators have been 
constructed. Let us note, however, that many of them omit the formal conditions set out 
in the previous section, using instead an intuitive understanding of the relationships and 
mechanisms described by the concept of fiscal sustainability (Blanchard, 1990, p. 8; 
Chalk & Hemming, 2000, p. 67).  
The most important and frequently used indicators have been proposed by O.J. 
Blanchard (1990, p. 14), who found it advisable to calculate the primary gap in order to 
obtain basic information about the sustainability of public finance:  
݀̅ − ݀௦ = (ߠ௦ − ݎ௦)ܾ௦ − ݀௦, (6) 
where: ݀̅ – primary deficit ensuring stability of the debt/GDP ratio. The indicator given 
by equation 6 shows the adjustment of the debt/GDP ratio in a given year. Its negative 
values show that the actual budget deficit is too large for the sustainability conditions to 
be met. This said, we need to bear in mind that the indicator disregards the possible 
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future effects of the current fiscal policy or the residuals of earlier measures that will 
materialise with a lag (Blanchard, 1990, p. 14).  
Being aware of the deficiencies of the primary gap indicator, Blanchard et al. 
(1990, p. 12-13) came up with a concept of a sustainable tax rate and a tax gap 
indicator. With the condition defined by equation (4) and the data on government 
expenditures and transfer payments, it is possible to find a tax rate ensuring fiscal 
sustainability, i.e. to solve equation (4) for a fixed value of ݐ௦ marked with ݐ∗. A 
positive difference between the rate of ݐ∗ and the present tax rate ݐ௦, known as the tax 
gap indicator, shows the amount by which the tax rate needs to be adjusted for the fiscal 
sustainability conditions to be met. A common practice is to test the tax gap in the short, 
medium and long term (Blanchard et al., 1990, have proposed to build indicators for the 
current period, 3 years and 30 years). 
The short-term tax gap indicator given by the following formula: 
ݐ଴
∗ − ݐ௦ = ݃௦ + ℎ௦ − ݐ௦ + (ݎ௦ − ߠ௦)ܾ௦ = ݀௦ + (ݎ௦ − ߠ௦)ܾ௦, (7) 
amounts to the primary gap indicator. The medium- and long-term indicators can be 
calculated as follows (Blanchard, 1990, p. 14-15; Blanchard et. al., 1990, p. 15-16):  
ݐ௡∗ − ݐ௦ =
∑ ௚ೞషೕା௛ೞషೕ
೙
ೕసబ
௡
+ (ݎ௦ − ߠ௦)ܾ௦ − ݐ௦, (8) 
The indicators built on the tax gap concept are much more reliable than the primary gap 
ratio. Even so, they are not free of some deficiencies, such as the arbitrary selection of 
the time horizon and of the fiscal target to be achieved at the end of it. The fiscal target 
problem is particularly vital in countries with relatively sound public finances and low 
levels of public debt. In this case, a slight increase in the debt/GDP ratio does not 
necessarily have to mean that the fiscal sustainability conditions have been breached, as 
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it may naturally follow from changes in the economic system that pose no risk to the 
fiscal sustainability of the State. Moreover, although the tax gap indicators tell us about 
how severe stability threats can be in the analysed period, they do not specify when they 
are likely to occur (Balassone & Franco, 2000, p. 44; Chalk & Hemming, 2000, p. 69).  
3.2.Econometric tests  
Fiscal sustainability indicators contain limited information on the country's fiscal stance 
and are often determined by subjective criteria adjusted to the scope of research. 
Because the econometric tests of fiscal sustainability are more objective, they are 
frequently employed to verify empirically the theory. Since we have already shown that 
the so-called transversality condition (3) is a prerequisite of fiscal stability, most tests 
are developed to see if it is met in practice.  
The first fiscal stability tests created by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Wilcox 
(1989) investigated the stationarity of the public debt time series. They were criticized 
because their assumptions were considered overly restrictive.  
As the time series methods developed, a more general approach taking 
advantage of cointegration testing was proposed. Having analysed the debt-
accumulation equation: 
∆ܤ௦ = ݎܤ௦ିଵ − ܵ௦, (9) 
Trehan and Walsh (1991, p. 209-212) concluded that for constant (stationary) real 
interest rates, the transversality condition is satisfied when the process generating 
budget surpluses diminished by interest payments is integrated of finished order. 
Therefore, the time series ܵ௦ and ܤ௦ିଵ have to be a stationary linear combination. In 
other words, if the ܵ௦ series is stationary ܤ௦ should also be stationary, but when ܵ௦ is 
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non-stationary, a positive cointegrating relationship should exist between the ܵ௦ and 
ܤ௦ିଵ series. Rejecting the assumption about constant real interest rates, Trehan and 
Walsh found that the stationarity of the first differences of public debt was a condition 
for fiscal sustainability. Overall, a fiscal policy is “strongly sustainable” when 
ܤ, ܵ~ܫ(0) or ܤ, ܵ~ܥܫ with a cointegrating vector [1; ߟ], where ߟ < 0, or “weakly 
sustainable” for ∆ܤ~ܫ(0). 
Hakkio and Rush (1991, p. 434-435) designed a similar test. Assuming that 
interest rates are stationary, we can rewrite the intertemporal government budget 
constraint as follows: 
ܴ݁ݒ௦ = ߙ + ܧݔ݌௦ + lim௡→ஶ
஻ೞశ೙
(ଵା௥ೞ)೙
+ ߝ௦, (10) 
where: ܧݔ݌௦ – total government expenditures (including debt service) in period s, 
ܴ݁ݒ௦ – total government revenues in period s. 
When fiscal policy is sustainable, lim୬→ஶ
୆౩శ౤
(ଵା୰౩)౤
= 0, equation (10) easily 
translates into the following regression equation: 
ܴ݁ݒ௦ = ߙ + ߚܧݔ݌௦ + ߝ௦. (11) 
According to Hakkio and Rush (1991, p. 432), cointegration of the time series of 
government revenues and expenditures is a prerequisite of fiscal sustainability in a 
setting defined by equation (11). They also posit that the cointegrating vector is given 
by [1; −1], i.e. ߚ = 1. This assumption is widely debated in the literature. Some 
economists consider it over-restrictive in the context of the transversality condition 
given by equation (3) (de Castro & de Cos 2000, p. 145-147). They propose instead to 
limit the scope of empirical tests to the examination of cointegration of the above time 
series. The rationale is that for ߚ ߳ (0; 1) the discounted value of debt still tends towards 
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zero when n goes to infinity.  
Hakkio and Rush argue, however, that in this case the value of non-discounted 
public debt grows exponentially over an infinite time-horizon, increasing the likelihood 
of the emergence of debt service problems as well as raising the probability of the 
government announcing bankruptcy at some point of time. (Hakkio & Rush, 1991, p. 
433). It is also noteworthy that the public and creditors tend to assess fiscal 
sustainability over a time horizon corresponding to the expected lifetime or even the 
maturity of debt securities issued by the State. This tendency may lead to the 
underestimation of the long-run effects of debt reduction that result from its 
discounting. It is important to note that the problem of excessive debt accumulation and 
of rising costs of debt service can also be caused by factors other than purely economic, 
such as shocks of political or social nature. In such cases, the financial market’s falling 
confidence can bring about a sudden and substantial increase in interest rates, which is 
more likely when the discounting factor is the only instrument that a country uses to 
maintain fiscal sustainability. This can lead to debt-servicing problems and the 
shrinking of the economy.  
In the context of the aforementioned arguments, researchers have reached a 
consensus according to which countries are either characterised by „strong 
sustainability” (ߚ = 1) or by “weak sustainability” (ߚ ߳ (0; 1)). When ߚ < 1 fiscal 
policy is unsustainable regardless of whether a cointegrating relationship does or does 
not exist (Quintos,1995). 
In the Trehan and Walsh test and the Hakkio and Rush test, stationarity analysis 
is based on the ADF or Phillips-Perron tests (Uctum & Wickens, 2000, 210). The 
estimates of the cointegrating vector are obtained from the two-step Engle-Granger 
method. The procedure can make the sustainability tests somewhat less reliable, though, 
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due to the well-documented problem of over-rejection of non-stationary null hypothesis 
in the case of unit root tests with small samples (Balke & Fomby, 1991). 
Bohn (2007) has proved mathematically that under the transversality condition 
given by equation (3) every fiscal policy ensuring cointegration between the time series 
of public debt and government deficit is sustainable, regardless of their order of 
integration. Based on that, he proposed focusing on the analysis of the so-called „fiscal 
reaction function” given as: 
ݏ௦ = ߙ + ߩܾ௦ + ߝ௦, (12) 
and leaving the question of cointegration aside. According to his proposal, fiscal policy 
is sustainable as long as parameter ρ is positive and statistically significant. Although 
theoretically correct and overwhelmingly popular in recent empirical research, this 
methodology has some potential pitfalls that may lead to questionable results (see e.g. 
Mackiewicz, 2010, p. 135), which confirms that the pure transversality condition is too 
weak a restriction for the purposes of the empirical assessment of fiscal sustainability. 
Hence, many researchers still hold that cointegration is a necessary condition for the 
stability of public finances (Gabriel & Sangduan, 2010). 
Another major issue is the structural invariance of the test model parameters. 
Because fiscal policy occasionally undergoes structural changes, there may be breaks in 
the data generating processes, which are responsible for the development of variables 
interesting from the fiscal sustainability perspective. Structural changes are a natural 
consequence of political cycles determined by election dates and of stabilisation 
programmes introduced to improve the fiscal stance. All these factors may bias the 
evaluation of fiscal policy based on a traditional unit root and cointegration tests. To 
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confirm that the tests’ results are accurate, additional tests of the structural stability of 
the obtained models are proposed.  
A cointegrating regression can be tested for stability using the Gregory-Hansen 
test, the Hansen test, the Hansen-Johansen test, and the Hatemi-J test. The most popular 
and most powerful of them is the Gregory-Hansen test developed on the observation 
that when the cointegrating vector changes in the sample period the ADF and Phillips-
Perron tests are frequently unable to reject a null hypothesis about a lack of 
cointegration between the time series. In this case, it is advisable to test the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration against an alternative hypothesis stating that there is a 
cointegrating relationship that undergoes structural change. The test statistic is 
calculated separately for the three possible types of structural change using an 
appropriate cointegrating regression model. The possibility of a level shift being present 
in the cointegrating equation is tested with the following model: 
ݕଵ௦ = ߤଵ + ߤଶ߮௜ఛ + ߨݕଶ௦ + ݁௦, (13) 
where: ߮௜ఛ - dummy variable adopting values: ߮௜ఛ = ൜
0 for ݏ ≤ ⌊߬ܵ⌋
1 for ݏ > ⌊߬ܵ⌋
, ߬ ߳ (0; 1),  and  
⌊∎⌋ -  the entier function,  
ݕଶ௦  – the vector of explanatory variables, 
 eୱ – the I(0) error term. 
For the level shift with a trend, the model is yଵୱ = μଵ + μଶφ୧த + αଵt + αଶtφ୧த + πyଶୱ +
eୱ , and for the regime shift yଵୱ = μଵ + μଶφ୧த + αଵt + αଶtφ୧த + πଵyଶୱ + πଶyଶୱφ୧த + eୱ. 
The functional form of the model established, the recursive OLS estimation is 
performed for each [τS]. In the next step, the estimates are used to calculate the ADF 
and Phillips-Perron statistics. The lowest of them are compared with the critical values 
presented by Gregory and Hansen (1996a, 1996b). To make sure that the number of the 
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degrees of freedom is consistently adequate, calculations should be performed for 
τ ϵ [0.15; 0.85] (Gregory & Hansen 1996b, p. 556-559; de Castro & de Cos, 2000, p. 
161-162). The direct extension of the Gregory-Hansen method for two shifts during the 
sample period is the Hatemi-J test (2008). 
The proposed tests of stability of cointegrating regression have one major 
drawback in common – they are based on the assumption that the number of structural 
breaks is determined exogenously and relatively low (between 1 and 2). Therefore, they 
are not a perfect tool for analysing fiscal policies the nature of which may change 
frequently because of political events, business cycle fluctuations, institutional 
developments or even changes in the expectations of private agents induced by future 
policy announcements (e.g. when the announcements appear to be sufficient for the 
fulfilment of the intertemporal budget constraint). In addition to variations in the 
character of the cointegrating relationship, the volatility of the analysed time series may 
change too, influencing the variance of the underlying processes. 
In the above context, fiscal policy might be perceived as a random process with 
two possible states of an economy representing different fiscal regimes characterised, 
respectively, by fiscal sustainability and fiscal unsustainability. A state of an economy 
in a given period depends on a set of political, economic, technological and institutional 
factors. Permanent or transitory shocks to these factors that bring about sufficiently 
large or abrupt changes in economic performance cause an economy to move between 
fiscal regimes. To account for this, the variable describing the state of an economy is 
obtained from a process driven by independent shocks affecting the economy with some 
non-zero probability. The process solely depends on the current state of an economy, so 
it meets so-called Markov condition. As a result, the Markov process can be used to 
model transmission between the regimes and trace changes in the cointegrating 
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regressions describing fiscal policy. A formal test of fiscal sustainability based on the 
Markov-switching cointegration approach has been proposed by Gabriel and Sangduan 
(2011). 
Following Hakkio and Rush (1991), Gabriel and Sangduan (2011, p. 379) 
proposed assessing fiscal sustainability by examining the relationship between 
government expenditures and revenues given by equation (11). To obtain a model with 
varying parameters, they used the Markov-switching approach and estimated the 
equation: 
ܴ݁ݒ௦ = (ߙଵ + ߙଶߜ௦) + (ߚଵ + ߚଶߜ௦)ܧݔ݌௦ + (߱ଵ + ߱ଶߜ௦)݁௦. (14) 
where: ݁௦ is an I(0) error term and ߜ௦ is a discrete, latent state variable following an 
irreducible, aperiodic and ergodic Markov chain. The chain is assumed to be time-
homogeneous with the state space of {1,2} and transition probabilities ݌ =
ܲݎ(ߜ௦ = 1|ߜ௦ିଵ = 1), ݍ = ܲݎ(ߜ௦ = 2|ߜ௦ିଵ = 2). Consequently, the cointegrating 
vector has two regimes governed by the ߜ௦ process with the following parameters 
{(ߙଵ, ߚଵ, ߱ଵ), (ߙଶ, ߚଶ, ߱ଶ)}. This makes the model capable of differentiating between 
periods when the fiscal policy in an economy moving recursively between these two 
states was relatively sustainable and unsustainable. It is also assumed that processes 
may have different variance between states, ߱ఋೞ = {߱ଵ, ߱ଶ}. Due to this, the model can 
capture potentially low and high volatility regimes. In the proposed framework, 
unsustainability is induced by shocks hitting an economy, so it is fully justified to 
expect that the unsustainable state is more volatile than the sustainable one. Equation 
(14) is estimated using the maximum likelihood method (Hamilton, 1994). 
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With the proposed formulation of the cointegrating regression, we can obtain 
series of standardised residuals that can be tested for the order of integration using 
conventional approaches. The residuals are calculated as: 
݁௦ =
ோ௘௩ೞି൫ఈభෞ ାఉభ෢ ா௫௣ೞ൯୔୰(ఋೞୀଵ|ூೞ)ି൫ఈమෞ ାఉమ෢ ா௫௣ೞ൯୔୰(ఋೞୀଶ|ூೞ)
ቂఠభ
మ෢ ୔୰(ఋೞୀଵ|ூೞ)ାఠమ
మ෢ ୔୰(ఋೞୀଶ|ூೞ)ቃ
భ
మ
, (15) 
where ܲݎ(ߜ௦ = ݅|ܫ௦), ݅ = {1,2}, are the filter probabilities of the Markov switching 
process. This procedure follows closely that proposed by Gabriel, Psaradakis, and Sola 
(2002), who have shown that the asymptotic distributions of traditional test statistics 
offer good approximations of the actual ones when the standardised residuals are used, 
and do not cause size distortions when the hypotheses are tested against standard critical 
values. 
The test proposed by Gabriel and Sangduan (2011) is a generalisation of the 
concepts developed by Gregory and Hansen (1996a, 1996b) and Hatemi-J (2008) for the 
case of cointegration with multiple structural breaks. Its strength derives from the fact 
that the number of regime switches is not predetermined. At the same time, the test 
provides for only two states of nature that are characterised by sustainable and 
unsustainable fiscal policy, respectively. Accordingly, it is assumed that each episode of 
fiscal unsustainability is similar to the previous one in volatility and magnitude. Some 
may perceive this as a rather excessive simplification that can lessen the analytical 
significance of the results, especially when the degree of unsustainability is considered. 
 
4. Analysis of the fiscal sustainability of the Visegrad Group countries in 
the years 1996-2015 
Having presented the econometric tests and statistical indicators of fiscal sustainability, 
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we can now proceed to the empirical testing of the theory. The first step in the 
assessment of fiscal sustainability of the Visegrad Group countries is statistical analysis, 
the findings of which will be subsequently supplemented by the results of econometric 
tests. In this study, all four Visegrad Group countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia – are examined using annual ESA 2010 data from the years 1996-
2015 obtained from the Eurostat online database. Because the available annual data 
series is relatively short as it consists of only 20 observations, the robustness of some 
estimations is checked against the 2000-2015 quarterly data obtained from the same 
source (unseasoned using ARIMA X13 filter) to make sure that fiscal policy trends are 
well identified and the research results are reliable. For the lack of earlier data on 
interest rates, indicators based on real interest rates were only calculated for the years 
2001-2015.  
4.1. Results of statistical analysis 
The beginning of the sample coincides with the end of a long economic crisis that 
affected the Visegrad Group countries as they were transitioning from a centrally 
planned to a market-based economy. Their efforts to stabilise their economies proved 
successful and paved the way for the next stage of systemic reforms. Poland and 
Hungary that in the early transition period had a relatively high ratio of public debt to 
GDP (49% and 85.2%, respectively; Fig.1) introduced moderately restrictive fiscal 
policy to heal their public finances. This allowed them to gradually reduce their budget 
deficits in the years 1999 and 2000 to 2.3% and 3% of GDP, respectively (Fig. 2).  
Slovakia moved in the opposite direction. Its debt was initially low (22.1% of 
GDP), but expansionary fiscal policy conducted in the years 1996-2000 increased it by 
28 percentage points. The main blame for this lies with the country’s populist 
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governments that were reluctant to carry on with socially-costly reforms, but also, 
partly, with the fact that most industrial capacities of former Czechoslovakia were 
situated in the western part of the country, so after the independent states of Slovakia 
and Czech Republic emerged the latter took most of them. The result of it was high 
unemployment in Slovakia and bleak economic prospects. The uncertain structural 
situation and the repercussions of the Russian crisis of 1998 caused that the Slovakian 
deficit was quickly rising to reach 12% of GDP in 2000. As far as the Czech Republic is 
concerned, at the beginning of the analysed period the country had the lowest debt of all 
four countries – merely 14.6% of GDP. However, in the wake of the 1998 Russian crisis 
the Czechs abandoned restrictive fiscal policy and slowed down the pace of economic 
reforms, as a result of which the size of public debt increased considerably. Part of this 
increase should be attributed also to the adoption in 2003 of the ESA 95 methodology 
that classifies government guarantees issued to companies (formerly considered a 
potential liability) as part of public debt. Because all guarantees together accounted for 
12% of the Czech GDP (European Commission, 2004, p. 9), public deficit kept 
increasing until it reached a plateau of approximately 28% of GDP.  
Figure 1: Consolidated general government debt in the Visegrad Group countries in 1996-2015 (% 
of GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat online database.  
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The years 1999-2003 were a time of economic slowdown. Expansionary fiscal 
policy undertaken to reverse the effects of adverse business cycle increased budget 
deficits in all Visegrad Group countries to as much as 6.1-8.9 percent of their GDPs. 
With a view to enabling economic recovery and increase the space for fiscal reaction, 
structural reforms were launched. The most successful was Slovakia that cut its budget 
deficit to the level set by the Maastricht criteria. Its high economic growth in the years 
2004-2008 was accompanied by liberal reforms that considerably reduced public debt, 
to 27.7% of GDP in 2008. The Polish and Czech reforms proved much less effective. 
Issues such as inefficiencies in healthcare, pension and social security systems are still 
widely debated in both countries. Notwithstanding the reduction of their budget deficits 
in the years 2003-2007, Poland and the Czech Rep. only managed to stabilize the debt-
to-GDP ratios at 47% and 29%, respectively. The worst performer in that period was 
Hungary. Economic slowdown increased its budget deficit to about 8% of GDP and 
with a lack systemic reforms preventing the reduction of debt, a debt crisis erupted in 
2006. Overall, the Hungarian debt/GDP ratio rose by more than 25 percentage points.  
Figure 2: General government deficits in the Visegrad Group countries in 1996-2015 (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat online database.  
The global economic crisis in the years 2007-2009 deteriorated the fiscal 
positions of all four countries, resulting in substantial increases in deficit financing and 
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public debt levels. Government deficits caused by fiscal intervention ranged from 7.9% 
(Slovakia) to 5.5% of GDP (Hungary). In the aftermath of the crisis, the Slovakian 
debt/GDP ratio increased the most (by 25 percentage points). This seems to prove that 
the euro-country governments consider the Maastricht criteria to be binding as long as 
they seek accession to the Eurozone, but afterwards the criteria are largely ignored and 
fiscal discipline is relaxed. In the other three countries, fiscal expansion was more 
modest, resulting in debt increases of between 17 and 15 percentage points (the Czech 
Republic and Hungary) and 12 percentage points (Poland). After 2013, all four 
countries focused on stabilising public debt levels and expanding fiscal reaction space. 
As they tightened their budgets to meet the Maastricht criteria, the European 
Commission terminated the Excessive Debt Procedure that had been imposed on them 
before. By 2015, fiscal stabilisation allowed Poland, the Czech Rep. and Slovakia to 
reduce their debt-to-GDP ratios to 51.3%, 41.1% and 52.9%. By the criteria of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), their fiscal policy was sustainable. Hungary was the 
only Visegrad Group country that failed to reduce its debt/GDP ratio below the level of 
60% set in the Pact (75.3% in 2015), but following the implementation of an IMF 
stabilisation programme it has improved the ratio by 5.5 percentage points over the last 
4 years. Changes observed in the Hungary’s fiscal stance seem to promise well for the 
future. 
The medium-term performance of fiscal policies pursued by the Visegrad Group 
countries and other EU member states can be compared by means of graphs showing 
relations between debt/GDP ratios and 3-year averages of budget deficits (Fig. 3 and 4). 
The interpretation of the graphs is as interesting as straightforward. The axes intersect at 
the level of 60% of GDP, i.e. the upper limit on public debt allowed by the SGP. The 
countries in the fourth quadrant seem to run an immediate risk of debt crisis, because 
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their relatively high levels of debt are repeatedly accompanied by budget deficits. The 
first quadrant of the graph contains countries that can be at risk should their economic 
outlook or the nature of fiscal policy change. Their debt levels exceed 60% of GDP, but 
budgetary surpluses promise that troubles can be left behind. However, a budget deficit 
will send them to the fourth quadrant graph where the danger of a crisis is very likely. 
To avert it, they should immediately undertake fiscal reforms and take advantage of the 
present period of prosperity to improve their situation. The countries in the third 
quadrant have low levels of debt and pursue expansionary fiscal policy. Although they 
are not at risk of a debt crisis now, the continuation of this policy in the long run may 
threaten their fiscal stance and they may end up in the fourth quadrant. The last, second 
quadrant contains countries that are safe in the medium term because of low debt/GDP 
ratios and fiscal surpluses ensuring stability. An analysis of how their position changed 
in subsequent years can provide a preliminary assessment of their fiscal sustainability in 
the long term. To determine the long-term trends in the fiscal policy of the Visegrad 
Group countries the data from years 1997 and 2015 will be compared. 
Figure 3: Budget deficit/surplus and public debt levels in the European Union countries in 1997 (% 
of GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat online database.  
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Figure 4: Budget deficit/surplus and public debt levels in the European Union countries in 2015 (% 
of GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat online database.  
Figures 3 and 4 show that in the sample years unsustainability was increasing in 
actually all EU states. The number of countries at a direct risk of debt crisis (the fourth 
quadrant) increased from 10 in 1997 to 14 in 2015. Even the biggest and wealthiest 
European economies such as Germany, France, the Netherlands and UK are not safe. 
Hungary is the only Visegrad Group country under the threat of fiscal unsustainability. 
In addition to Hungarian public debt being persistently high (in both 1997 and 2015 
Hungary is in the fourth quadrant of the graph), the 2006 debt crisis and global 
economic crunch caused that Hungary’s budgetary position weakened significantly in 
the subsequent years The fiscal stance of the other Visegrad Group member states 
(Poland, the Czech Rep. and Slovakia), although not alarming from the perspective of 
the adopted criteria, worsened considerably in recent years mainly due to sustained 
deficit financing increasing their debt/GDP ratios. These unfavourable developments 
moved these three countries hazardously close to the maximum allowable debt-to-GDP 
ratio of 60%. 
Because the primary gap indicator makes it possible to compare the actual 
budget deficit with a budget deficit assuring the stabilisation of the debt/GDP ratio in a 
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given year, it can be used for assessing short-term fiscal sustainability. Its positive 
values mean that fiscal contraction is needed and negative values show that the 
debt/GDP ratio has been diminished and the real debt growth has reached a stable level. 
Figure 5 shows that in the period under consideration at least two subperiods of 
expansive fiscal policy were present, mainly because of the negative dynamics of 
business cycle between 2001 and 2003 and from 2008 to 2010. The maximum values of 
primary gaps in these subperiods amounted to 7 and 13 percentage points, respectively. 
In the intervening years, fiscal contraction gradually reducing excessive deficits was 
observed. Hungary was the only country that failed to achieve fiscal stabilisation 
between 2003 and 2007. In the second period of restrictive fiscal policy that 
commenced in 2011, all Visegrad Group countries managed to improve their fiscal 
policy and significantly reduced primary gaps.  
Figure 5: Primary gap indicator in the Visegrad Group countries in 2001-2015 (p.p.) 
 
Source: Eurostat online database.  
The last of the indicators proposed in section 3.1. is the index of medium-term 
tax gap (Figure 6). It shows the amount by which public revenues need to be increased 
for public debt to be stable. The results obtained with the tax gap indicator and with the 
primary gap indicator are basically consistent. They show that the Czech Rep. and 
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Slovakia still need to increase their revenues by about 10 percentage points to achieve 
fiscal sustainability, and Poland and Hungary by 12 percentage points. 
Summing up, the results yielded by the standard statistical analysis methods do 
not cause much concern about the fiscal prospects of the Visegrad Group countries. 
Hungary is the only country that seems to be faced with fiscal sustainability problems. 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are still relatively safe, but they need fiscal 
consolidation to expand space for fiscal reaction, which is today too narrow to enable 
the use of fiscal policy as a stabilising device should the business cycle took a negative 
turn. 
Figure 6: Medium-term (3-year) tax gap indicator in the Visegrad Group countries in 2001-2014 
(p.p.) 
 
Source: calculated by the author with data from the Eurostat online database. 
4.2.Results of econometric sustainability tests 
In this part of the paper, the results of analysis performed using a formal econometric 
methodology are presented. They were obtained, as before, with the annual 1996-2015 
data contained in the Eurostat online database. Because the available time series are 
quite short (only 20 observations), the research was faced with the problem of the small 
sample performance of stationarity and cointegration tests that tend to overreject null 
hypotheses (Balke & Fomby 1991), and with unsatisfactory small sample performance 
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of estimators. At the same time, though, the use of the annual data made it possible to 
assess fiscal policy performance in each year of the whole post-transformation period. 
Analysing a country’s fiscal policy over an annual period is also advisable, because 
institutional arrangements, etc., may contribute to the seasonality of different categories 
of government expenses and revenues, thus temporarily affecting the country’s fiscal 
stance. The quarterly fiscal data that were available only for the years 2000-2015 were 
used solely to test the robustness of our estimations. 
In the first stage of econometric analysis, the method proposed by Trehan and 
Walsh (1991) was used. The time series of the real consolidated public debt (Bs), the 
real primary surpluses (Ss), and their respective differences were employed to assess the 
fiscal sustainability of the Visegrad Group countries. The time series were tested for 
stationarity using the ADF, ADF-GLS and KPSS unit root tests and within the 
confirmatory analysis scheme. The null hypothesis in the ADF and ADF-GLS tests 
assumes that the time series being assessed is non-stationary, and that in the KPSS test 
that it is stationary. The null hypothesis being supported /rejected by one of the tests and 
rejected/supported by the other proves that the conclusions drawn from these tests are 
correct. The rejection or acceptance of the null hypothesis in each of the tests means 
that the tests are non-conclusive. While the procedure is not very efficient (Maddala, 
2008, p. 619), it offers significant benefits when short samples are considered (see e.g.: 
Kębłowski & Welfe, 2004). The lags for the ADF and ADF-GLS tests were selected 
using Hendry’s "from general to specific" method, which boils down to the recursive 
estimation of test equations during which a large number of lags is successively reduced 
until only the significant estimates are left. Maddala (2008, p. 615) argues that this 
approach  prevents the selection of excessively small lags, which is a common problem 
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when Akaike’s (AIC) or Bayesian informative criteria (BIC) are applied. The lags for 
the KPSS test were selected according to the relevant criterion (Welfe, 2009, p. 368).  
Table 1: Evaluation of fiscal sustainability of the Visegrad Group countries in 1995-2016 and its 
subperiods using Trehan and Walsh’s test (1991): 
Country Time series stationarity 
Cointegration 
Fiscal 
sustainability Bs Ss ΔBs ΔSs Δ
2Bs 
1996-2015 
Poland No Inconcl. Yes Yes - No Yes (Weak) 
Czech Rep. Inconcl. Inconcl. Yes Yes - No Yes (Weak) 
Hungary No No Inconcl. Yes Yes - No 
Slovakia Inconcl. Inconcl. Yes Yes - No Yes (Weak) 
1996-2006 
Poland No Inconcl. Yes Yes - No Yes (Weak) 
Czech Rep. No Inconcl. Yes Yes - No Yes (Weak) 
Hungary No No No Yes Yes - No 
Slovakia No Yes Yes - - - Yes (Weak) 
2007-2015 
Poland Inconcl. Yes Yes - - - Yes (Weak) 
Czech Rep. Yes Inconcl. - Yes - - Yes 
Hungary No Inconcl. Inconcl. Yes Yes - No 
Slovakia No No Inconcl. Yes Yes - No 
Source: calculated by the author. 
Table 1 summarizes test results obtained with the whole sample and two 
subperiods of 1996-2006 and 2007-2015. The first subperiod extends between the end 
of the transition period during which major reforms were launched and the eruption of 
the global financial crisis, and the second one spans the crisis and post-crisis years.  
The results clearly point to Hungary as the only Visegrad Group country where 
fiscal policy was consistently unsustainable over the sample years (the first differences 
of public debt are non-stationary). The policy slightly improved after the 2006 debt 
crisis after the introduction of an IMF stabilisation program, but it was still far from 
being at least weakly sustainable (the test results change from rejecting the hypothesis 
about the stationarity of the first differences of public debt to being inconclusive). 
In the other countries, fiscal policy that was at least weakly sustainable over the 
whole sample period differed between the subperiods. In the years 1996-2006 it was 
weakly sustainable in all three of them (in Poland also during the global financial crisis 
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and afterwards). The Czech Republic fully stabilised its public finances in the seven 
years between 2007 and 2015. Slovakia, where fiscal sustainability was relatively high 
in the years preceding its successful accession to the Eurozone in 2008, in the next years 
chose to relax the fiscal rules, as the SGP criteria were not binding anymore. As a result, 
its fiscal policy became unsustainable in the second subperiod. 
The results of analyses performed using the method proposed by Trehan and 
Walsh (1991) lead to a conclusion that the Polish and Czech fiscal policies were 
sustainable over the sample years, unlike that pursued by Hungary. There are also 
serious concerns about fiscal sustainability in Slovakia, especially in the years 2007-
2015. 
Table 2: Cointegration analysis of the time series of public revenues and expenditures in the 
Visegrad Group countries obtained using the Engle-Granger method and assessment of their 
fiscal sustainability using Hakkio and Rush’s test (1991): 
Country Sample period β1 AEG test 
p-value 
Fiscal 
sustainability 
Poland 1996-2015 0.902*** 0.014 Yes(Weak) 
1996-2006 0.895*** 0.001 Yes(Weak) 
2007-2015 0.924*** 0.001 Yes(Weak) 
Czech Rep. 1996-2015 0.970*** 0.042 Yes(Weak) 
1996-2006 0.922*** 0.580 No 
2007-2015 1.013*** 0.477 No 
Hungary 1996-20151) 0.955*** 0.523 No 
1996-20062) 0.816*** 0.079 No 
2007-2015 1.049*** 0.235 No 
Slovakia 1996-2015 0.903***a) 0.048 Yes (Weak) 
1996-20061) 0.891***a) 0.121 No 
2007-2015 0.905***a) 0.210 No 
AEG stands for the Augmented Engle-Granger test, i.e. the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test of residuals 
from the cointegrating regression. 
The null hypothesis of significance of estimates is rejected at *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.  
1) A cointegrating vector obtained assuming that the process generating budget revenues is I (1) . 
2) A cointegrating vector obtained assuming that the processes generating expenditures and revenues are I 
(1). 
a) A cointegrating relationship without a constant. 
Source: calculated by the author.  
Because the fiscal stability conditions imposed by the method proposed by 
Hakkio and Rush (1991) are more restrictive, it can be used to test the robustness of the 
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earlier results. This analysis utilises the time series of real general government 
expenditures (Exps) and revenues (Revs) and their first differences. To test the time 
series stationarity, the confirmatory analysis is used. Its results are presented in detail in 
Table A.1, Appendix 1. The testing procedure generally confirmed that the time series 
under consideration were difference-stationary. In four cases the results were 
inconclusive, but because I(2) processes are not very common among macroeconomic 
time series, we attributed this to the existence of structural breaks rather than to the non-
stationarity of the first differences and proceeded for now as if they were I(1). The 
cointegrating regression estimates used in the analysis were determined from the Engle-
Granger two-step procedure. The estimates are summarised in Table 2. 
When the whole sample was considered, the method proposed by Hakkio and 
Rush and the Trehan and Walsh procedure yielded almost identical results. They 
showed that three of the Visegrad Group countries (Poland, Czech Rep. and Slovakia) 
were weakly sustainable (the cointegrating relationship is present but it is statistically 
significantly different from 1) and that Hungary lacked fiscal sustainability in all years. 
The results for the subperiods are less clear. Meaningful estimates of the cointegrating 
relationships were obtained only for Poland. They show that Poland slightly tightened 
its fiscal policy after 2007, but not enough to restore fiscal sustainability. For the other 
countries, cointegrating relationships that make residuals stationary were not obtained. 
The standard interpretation of the subperiod results points to unsustainable fiscal policy 
in the Czech Rep., Hungary, Slovakia, but it is challenged by the results obtained for the 
Czech Rep. and Slovakia over the whole sample. The situation may be due to some 
misspecification of the structural break data, to which the method of analysis was 
sensitive. To find whether it was so, the potential date of a structural break was 
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specified using the Gregory-Hansen test. We assumed that a structural change affects 
the slope of the cointegrating relationship. The results of this test are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Results of  Gregory-Hansen test of stability of cointegrating regression of public revenues 
and expenditures 
Country Breakpoint 
date 
ADF 
statistic 
Breakpoint 
date 
PP (Zt) 
statistic 
Poland 2012 -5.86*** 2008 -3.84 
Czech Rep. 2008 -4.37 2008 -4.49 
Hungary 2003 -5.36** 2004 -5.07** 
Slovakia 2007 -4.06 2007 -4.17 
The null hypothesis of significance of estimates is rejected at *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.  
Source: calculated by the author.  
The analysis revealed that a structural break may have occurred in Poland in 
2012 and in Hungary in 2003-2004. As far as Poland is concerned, the break may have 
been caused by the retightening of fiscal policy with a view to making the European 
Commission lift the Excessive Deficit Procedure. In Hungary, the probable reason was 
the explosion of deficit financing that precipitated the crisis in 2006. The results 
obtained for Poland suggest that fiscal sustainability should be tested for two subperiods 
of 1996-2012 and 2012-2015. As the second period is very short, it is difficult to obtain 
meaningful results for Poland. Let us therefore focus our attention on Hungary. The 
results of additional estimations are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Additional assessment of Hungary’s fiscal sustainability using Hakkio and Rush’s test 
(1991): 
Country Sample period β1 AEG test 
p-value 
Fiscal 
sustainability 
Hungary 1996-20151) 0.955*** 0.523 No 
1996-20042) 0.845*** 0.100 No 
2004-2015 1.069*** 0.056 Yes 
AEG stands for the Augmented Engle-Granger test, i.e. the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test of residuals 
from the cointegrating regression. 
The null hypothesis of significance of estimates is rejected at *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.  
1) A cointegrating vector obtained assuming that the process generating budget revenues is I (1) . 
2) A cointegrating vector obtained assuming that the processes generating expenditures and revenues are I (1). 
Source: calculated by the author.  
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The results of re-estimation of the cointegrating regression are much closer to 
those obtained earlier from the Trehan and Walsh method. They show that in the initial 
period (1996 to 2004) Hungary’s fiscal policy was very unsustainable. After 2004, the 
government efforts gradually stabilised the situation, but not sufficiently to ensure fiscal 
sustainability over the whole period of analysis. It needs to be noted, however, that 
these results are conditional on the assumption about only one structural break in the 
analysed period. This shows the main weakness of the Hakkio and Rush method (1991), 
i.e. its high sensitivity to the presence of structural breaks and the manner of specifying 
them. The results presented in the next paragraphs were obtained with the method 
proposed by Gabriel and Sangduan (2011), who improved the Hakkio and Rush (1991) 
framework by using Markov chains to generalise the process of specification of 
structural breaks. Because their method does not involve any restrictions on the total 
number of structural breaks in the data, the estimates of cointegrating relationships it 
produces are more accurate. 
To ensure comparability between the results obtained with the Markov-
switching cointegration models and traditional sustainability tests, the annual data on 
government expenditures and revenues were used again. As problems with the small 
sample performance of the estimators were expected, additional analysis utilizing the 
available quarterly data was carried out to test the estimates’ robustness to changes in 
model specification. Estimations were based on the Markov-switching dynamic 
regression model (MSDR) that allows for switches in the constant, slope and variance 
of the analysed relationship. The initial values of unconditional probabilities were 
obtained from the pre-estimation of an analogous model with constant variance. 
Because the model was based on data in levels and our earlier research showed that the 
time series of public expenditures and revenues were I(1), the estimates generated by 
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the model can be taken to represent the coefficients of the cointegrating vector. To find 
out if it was so, we performed, following Gabriel et al. (2002), the Augmented Engle-
Granger (AEG) test, i.e. an ADF test of stationarity of standardised residuals obtained 
from the MSDR model. In the next step, the t and 2 statistics of the hypotheses about 
parameter values varying across the states were computed and, finally, fiscal 
performance was compared between the Visegrad Group countries. 
Table 5: Estimates of Markov switching dynamic regression model of the Visegrad Group countries 
in 1996-2015 – annual data 
Statistic type Country Poland Czech Rep. Hungary1) Slovakia 
State 1 
estimates 
const 10060.3
*** 
(742.3) 
-31483.9 
(65100.7) 
-753962.3*** 
(185020.8) 
-675.9* 
(368.8) 
Exps 
0.819*** 
(0.002) 
0.924*** 
(0.047) 
0.964*** 
(0.021) 
0.888*** 
(0.030) 
Var 655.5 
(57.6) 
31897.1 
(5767.5) 
234436.6 
(60108.2) 
770.4 
(115.9) 
State 2 
estimates 
const -2872.3 
(4212.3) 
-56641.8*** 
(17704.7) 
-152662.1*** 
(35347.8) 
-419.4*** 
(149.4) 
Exps 
0.920*** 
(0.110) 
1.001*** 
(0.016) 
0.964*** 
(0.004) 
0.950*** 
(0.005) 
Var 9054.6 
(1580.8) 
22046.5 
(4770.6) 
66299 
(9258.7) 
207.1 
(39.7) 
Transition 
probabilities 
p11 
0.563 
(0.368) 
0.707 
(0.175) 
0.869 
(0.084) 
0.701 
(0.141) 
p21 
0.102 
(0.071) 
0.211 
(0.203) 
0.075 
(0.093) 
0.171 
(0.121) 
t-tests 
(p-values) 
Exps ≥1 
(State 1) 
0.000 0.052 0.043 0.000 
Exps ≥1 
(State 2) 
0.000 0.513 0.000 0.000 
chi2 test 
(p-value) 
Var (State1) = 
Var (State 2) 
0.000 0.199 0.000 0.000 
AEG test t-adf -3.475*** -3.502*** -4.062*** -3.318** 
Fiscal 
sustainability 
State 1 Yes (weak) Yes (weak) Yes (weak) Yes (weak) 
State 2 Yes (weak) Yes Yes (weak) Yes (weak) 
The null hypothesis of significance of estimates rejected at *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Values of 
robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
1) A cointegrating vector obtained assuming that the process generating budget revenues is I (1). 
Source: calculated by the author.  
Table 5 provides a summary of estimates obtained with the annual data. To 
enable comparisons, in Table B.1 of Appendix B the estimates based on the quarterly 
data are also presented. The use of different sample periods causes, however, that the 
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yearly and quarterly estimates are not numerically comparable, so the latter were mainly 
used to test the robustness of general trends captured by the models.  
The standard (yearly) models and the aforementioned traditional tests of fiscal 
sustainability yielded results that are generally alike. They basically show that in all 
analysed countries fiscal policy was “weakly” sustainable (the AEG test revealed that 
each of the estimated relationships was a stationarity-inducing combination). Two 
regimes characterised by different fiscal policy and volatility of economic processes 
were identified. The first of them (State 1) involved relatively low sustainability of 
public finances and high volatility of economic situation. The second regime (State 2) 
was marked by improved solvency and low economic volatility. Some exception to this 
pattern was the Czech Republic, for which statistically significant differences in 
variance were not observed. The Czech Republic was also the only Visegrad Group 
country that succeeded in fully stabilising its fiscal policy. In the Czech case, the t-test 
failed to reject the hypothesis that the estimate of State 2 β parameter was equal to or 
higher than 1, a prerequisite of “strong” fiscal sustainability. 
Because the estimation procedure used a relatively short sample consisting of 
only 20 observations, its outcomes may have been biased. Therefore, additional 
estimations based on the 2000-2015 quarterly data and a sample of 64 observations 
were performed. The obtained results were numerically incomparable because the lack 
of appropriate quarterly data resulted in different time spans of the samples, but they 
still could be used to assess the validity of general tendencies identified by the model 
and to compare the quality of the estimates. 
The quarterly data model, too, identified two regimes with different fiscal policy 
and economic volatility. All four countries pursued fiscal policies that were at least 
weakly sustainable, but only the Czech fiscal policy was perceived as “strongly” 
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sustainable over the whole period of analysis, i.e. under both regimes. Hungary 
successfully achieved full stabilisation of its budgetary expenses in one of the regimes. 
The analysis of robust standard errors in both models were, quite naturally, slightly to 
the advantage of the quarterly data; however, the results of the model based on yearly 
data, especially the estimates of the parameters describing the amount of 
interdependence between the levels of budgetary revenues and expenditures, were 
almost equally good.  
Figure 7: Filtered probabilities of appearance of MSDR model State 1 in the Visegrad Group 
countries in 1996-2015– a comparison of results based on the annual and quarterly data. 
 
Source: calculated by the author.  
The last question about the two models’ estimates concerns their accuracy in 
predicting regime changes and therefore periods of potentially lower or higher 
sustainability of fiscal policy. It can be answered by with the use of Figure 7 that 
compares the filtered probabilities of State 1 occurring obtained from both models. It is 
easy to see that the results they yielded are almost identical. The only major difference 
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between them is that the annual data model failed to predict a likely deterioration of 
fiscal sustainability in Poland in the years 2000-2005. The models also differ slightly in 
their assessment of the performance of Hungary’s fiscal policy from 2006 to 2009, but it 
is possible that the differences were caused by the inability of the low-frequency data to 
quickly reflect changes in the economy and not necessarily by the inefficiency of the 
small sample estimates of the models’ parameters. 
Based on the estimates obtained from the MSDR model it can be concluded that 
the Czech Republic has the best fiscal stance of all Visegrad Group countries, the 
finances of which were very sustainable in the years 1996-2000, 2005-2008, as well as 
after 2013. Two episodes of less restrictive countercyclical fiscal policy observed 
between 2000 and 2005 and during the last economic crisis (2008-2013) did not weaken 
their fiscal stance too much. As far as Poland is concerned, episodes of weakly 
sustainable fiscal policy were noted at the very beginning of the analysed period and in 
2009-2011. In all the other years, Poland’s fiscal stance, although still a far cry from 
being strongly sustainable, was not at risk. The situation of Slovakia and Hungary was 
much worse. Slovakia’s fiscal policy was relatively sustainable mainly in the years 
preceding its entry to the Eurozone and Hungary had major fiscal sustainability 
problems between 2001 and 2013. 
5. Policy implications 
In summing up the above findings, one needs to note that the statistical analysis and the 
econometric analysis similarly assessed the fiscal position of the Visegrad Group 
countries. The fiscal policy changes in the Czech Republic and Poland moved both 
countries closer to fiscal sustainability and allowed them to maintain space for fiscal 
reaction. Considering that the present level of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the Czech Rep. 
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is 41% and that the average countercyclical reaction of the Visegrad Group countries 
during the economic crises of 2000-2003 and 2007-2010 was within 9% of their GDPs 
per year, that level is probably sufficient for the Czech Rep. to tackle a potential 
downturn in economic activity without infringing the SGP limit of 60%. Nevertheless, 
Poland should stick to its restrictive fiscal policy in the years to come to protect its 
fiscal reaction space. The feasibility of this under the present political leadership is 
uncertain, particularly that the budget discipline has already been seriously breached by 
the introduction of large-scale public spending schemes such as the Family 500+ child 
benefit program, free medicines for seniors and the reversal of the retirement age 
reform. 
Slovakia was very skilful in reducing public debt during the Eurozone accession 
process, but after it was granted membership in 2008 and the SGP constraints were 
lifted it posted the highest budget deficit of all the Visegrad Group countries that 
significantly increased its debt/GDP ratio. Slovakia is not likely to restore fiscal stability 
without reversing this trend, particularly that Slovakian public debt is quickly heading 
for 60% of GDP. The case of Hungary is much more complex. The eruption of public 
discontent in 2006 forced Hungarian politicians to change fiscal policy, but with public 
debt as high as 80% of GDP, their efforts to stabilise the country’s economy proved 
insufficient. Hungary still needs reforms stimulating economic development and 
improving its fiscal position through major changes to healthcare, social security and 
pension systems, but it is questionable if the present populist government will be willing 
to undertake them. 
6. Conclusion 
This article provides an empirical assessment of fiscal sustainability in the Visegrad 
36 
 
Group countries from 1996 through 2015. Analysis was performed using both statistical 
and econometric methods that yielded consistent results. The traditional methods of 
analysing fiscal sustainability proved vulnerable to the specification issues, e.g. the 
specification of structural breaks. The results of fiscal sustainability testing may differ 
considerably when the selected number and timing of breaks lead to highly unrealistic 
assumptions. This problem can be solved by employing methods that generalise and 
objectify the selection of structural breaks, such as the Markov switching cointegration 
models. 
The empirical analysis has showed that none of the Visegrad countries managed 
to introduce a fully sustainable fiscal policy in the sample years. The Czech Republic 
proved the most successful in this respect. The Polish and Slovak debt/GDP ratios were 
still dangerously close to the 60% limit imposed on government debt by the Stability 
and Growth Pact. The worst situation was observed in Hungary, where healthcare and 
social security and pension systems are still in need of major reforms to improve the 
country’s fiscal stance. In none of the four countries did fiscal stability deteriorate as a 
result of the global economic crisis, because after short periods of expansionary, 
countercyclical fiscal policy they quickly resorted to more restrictive policies. More 
fiscal improvements are, however, necessary for the Visegrad group countries to have 
sufficient space for fiscal reaction in the future. 
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Appendix A. Results of the unit root tests: 
Table A. 1: Evaluation of stationarity of the time series of general government 
expenditures and revenues of the Visegrad Group countries in years 1995-2016 and 
subperiods: 
Country Time series stationarity 
Exps Revs ΔExps ΔRevs 
1996-2016 
Poland No No Yes Yes 
Czech Rep. No No Yes Yes 
Hungary No No Yes Inconcl. 
Slovakia No No Yes Yes 
1996-2006 
Poland No No Yes Yes 
Czech Rep. No No Yes Yes 
Hungary No No Inconcl. Inconcl. 
Slovakia No No Yes Inconcl. 
2007-2016 
Poland Inconcl. Inconcl. Yes Yes 
Czech Rep. No No Yes Yes 
Hungary No No Yes Yes 
Slovakia No No Yes Yes 
Source: calculated by the author 
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Appendix B. Markov-switching dynamic regression model – 
robustness check: 
Table B.1: Estimates of Markov switching dynamic regression model of the Visegrad 
Group countries in 2000-2015 – quarterly data 
Statistic type Country Poland Czech Rep. Hungary1) Slovakia 
State 1 
estimates 
const 18699.7
*** 
(5021.5) 
-5858.7 
(33550.8) 
-1124415.0*** 
(157844.8) 
-248.6*** 
(90.6) 
Exps 
0.726*** 
(0.039) 
0.898*** 
(0.087) 
0.523*** 
(0.051) 
0.898*** 
(0.021) 
Var 2408.1 
(629.6) 
19739.7 
(4068.9) 
83789.9 
(16199.2) 
234.77 
(22.6) 
State 2 
estimates 
const 4397.9 
(7070.5) 
-66692.0*** 
(23202.6) 
210282.2 
(314849) 
-42.9 
(62.9) 
Exps 
0.891*** 
(0.046) 
1.117*** 
(0.061) 
0.874*** 
(0.093) 
0.940*** 
(0.011) 
Var 3845.1 
(586.2) 
11403.8 
(1119.6) 
114157.1 
(12385.6) 
125.9 
(14.7) 
Transition 
probabilities 
p11 
0.927 
(0.074) 
0.838 
(0.073) 
0.943 
(0.039) 
0.942 
(0.047) 
p21 
0.048 
(0.025) 
0.088 
(0.043) 
0.049 
(0.037) 
0.048 
(0.030) 
t-tests 
(p-values) 
Exps ≥1 
(State 1) 
0.000 0.118 0.000 0.000 
Exps ≥1 
(State 2) 
0.009 0.973 0.088 0.000 
chi2 test 
(p-value) 
Var (State1) = 
Var (State 2) 
0.139 0.011 0.180 0.000 
AEG test t-adf -4.843*** -5.778*** -5.667 *** -5.352*** 
Fiscal 
sustainability 
State 1 Yes (weak) Yes Yes (weak) Yes (weak) 
State 2 Yes (weak) Yes Yes Yes (weak) 
The null hypothesis of significance of estimates rejected at *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Values of 
robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
1) A cointegrating vector obtained assuming that the process generating budget revenues is I (1). 
Source: calculated by the author.  
 
 
